The Mirage Holding Up Indo-Pacific Security

As the world’s largest arms importer, India isn’t simply upgrading its firepower—it’s reshaping how defense capabilities are built and shared. It now demands co-production, technology transfers, and local deployment. At the center of this shift is France, not just a supplier but a strategic interlocutor. Over the past decade, India has reduced its reliance on Russian arms from 76% to 36% while becoming France’s largest defense customer, accounting for nearly 30% of its arms exports (Wezeman et al. 2024, 6-9).

Unlike the U.S., whose arms sales regime extends extraterritorially, imposes strict retransfer and re-export controls, and subjects buyers to extensive end-use monitoring—even tracking foreign nationals and dual citizens—or Russia, which now prioritizes its own war effort, France delivers high-end systems without restrictive conditions (Imperial College London 2025). As French Ambassador to India Emmanuel Lenain put it, “No other country is so committed to making available to Indian forces the best technology, without restrictions” (Saballa 2023).

Anchored in Trust

Indo-French ties have evolved over decades, deepening from historical and diplomatic connections into a trusted defense partnership. Puducherry, a former French colony, remains an institutional link, reflected in its membership in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Francophonie (Varma 2024).

This foundation has translated into sustained security cooperation, particularly as India diversifies away from its historically dominant supplier—Russia. Nowhere is this trust more evident than at sea. The Varuna naval exercise, established in 1983, remains central to Indo-Pacific security, enhancing maritime coordination and interoperability (Economic Times 2019). Their 2018 logistics agreement further strengthened this partnership, granting mutual base access in the Indian Ocean (French Embassy in New Delhi 2018).

France’s reliability as a defense partner is reflected in India’s most strategic military acquisitions. The Mirage 2000 deal in the 1980s introduced high-end aerospace technology, followed by the 2016 Rafale purchase, which modernized India’s air force (SP Guide Publications 2010). At sea, the P-75 Scorpène submarine program, co-developed with Mazagon Dock in Mumbai, strengthened India's naval-industrial base and accelerated its shift toward domestic defense production (Naval Technology 2021).

Shedding Old Armour

Over 90% of the Indian Army’s armored vehicles, 69% of the Air Force and Navy’s combat aircraft, and 44% of the Navy’s warships and submarines are Russian-made—65% of which rely on Russian missiles (Waldwyn and Solanki 2023). Between 2011 and 2021, India imported $22.8 billion in Russian arms, nearly twice the combined total from the U.S., U.K., Israel, and France (Bommakanti and Patil 2022).

That dependence is eroding. The war in Ukraine has accentuated Russia’s defense capacity, delaying exports and straining munitions supplies as Moscow prioritizes its own war effort (Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2024, 11). India is already feeling the impact. Indo-Russian Rifles Private Limited, a joint venture launched in 2018 to produce AK-203 rifles in India, has been plagued by setbacks over pricing and localization. Despite a 2021 deal to manufacture 671,000 units, production had stalled—by July 2024, only 35,000 rifles had been delivered, with just 10,000 reaching troops (India’s Ministry of Defence 2021; Gupta 2024).

But India isn’t just replacing suppliers—it is overhauling its national security ecosystem. Under Aatmanirbhar Bharat (Self-Reliant India) and Make in India, flagship initiatives led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, defense procurement is shifting from foreign dependence to domestic production and indigenous innovation, with programs like the Tejas fighter jet leading the way (Mukherjee 2024).

France’s Trump Card

France has become India’s most adaptable and comprehensive defense ally. Unlike Israel, which specializes in niche technologies like UAVs and radars, or the U.S., which conditions sales on restrictive end-use agreements, France provides full-spectrum, cutting-edge systems with complete industrial collaboration (Israel’s Ministry of Defence 2018).

Nowhere is this more evident than in aerospace. Safran and India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation are co-developing an engine for the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft Mk 2, India’s next-generation fighter. Unlike past deals, Safran has committed to full technology transfer—spanning design, development, certification, and production—a rare concession in global jet engine manufacturing. This partnership also strengthens India’s expertise in materials and metallurgy. Safran is further supporting India’s Multi-Role Helicopter program by transferring forging and casting technology for the Shakti engine (Prajapati 2025).

France’s Indo-Pacific footprint reinforces this alignment. Unlike external stakeholders, France is a resident power, with 1.65 million citizens in its overseas territories and control of the world’s second-largest exclusive economic zone (10.2 million km²). Its diplomatic reach spans 39 Indo-Pacific states, while its educational and research investments shape regional talent pipelines. France operates 95 educational institutions in the Indo-Pacific, enrolling 53,000 students, and hosts another 50,000 from Asia-Oceania in its universities. Its leadership in regional organizations has also expanded—it held the presidency of the Indian Ocean Commission from 2021-2022 and joined the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) in 2020, advancing cooperation in maritime security, economic development, and disaster response (Government of France 2025, 1-5).

Building on this momentum, President Macron and Prime Minister Modi reaffirmed their commitment to defense cooperation in 2024 under the Defence Industrial Roadmap. A key initiative, the France-India Defence Startup Excellence (FRIND-X), launched in Paris in December 2024, brings together defense startups, investors, incubators, and academia to drive next-generation defense innovation and expand industrial collaboration (India’s Ministry of External Affairs 2025).

The U.S. Handicap

While India and the U.S. have deepened ties, their security relationship remains far less structured than Washington’s alliances with partners like Australia and Japan. Despite providing cutting-edge defense systems, U.S. export controls, operational restrictions, and end-use monitoring complicate technology transfers, limiting deeper cooperation.

This mistrust traces back to Cold War-era policies, when Washington prioritized its alliance with Pakistan, viewing it as the more reliable partner (U.S. Department of State 2019). As conflicts broke out between India and Pakistan in 1947, 1965, and 1971, with the U.S. providing intelligence support to Islamabad, and as India’s 1998 nuclear tests provoked American criticism, New Delhi had little choice but to turn to the only other full-spectrum power of the time.

U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower (1953–1961) later conceded that backing Pakistan militarily was "perhaps the worst kind of a plan and decision we could have made" (Gould 1996, 3080). His administration solidified U.S.-Pakistan security ties through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (1954) and the Baghdad Pact (1955), alliances intended to contain Soviet influence but which further alienated India from Washington.

By contrast, Indo-French ties have been far more productive, extending beyond security into strategic industries. In civil nuclear energy, France is constructing the Jaitapur nuclear power plant, set to be the world’s largest upon completion, supplying electricity to 70 million homes (EDF India 2025). In space, their long-standing partnership continues with Trishna, a joint mission to capture high-resolution thermal and visible imagery of Earth’s surface (CNES 2025).

The Window is Closing

Great powers set the stage, but middle powers write the script. Unlike superpowers, stretched thin by protracted wars and projecting influence, middle powers forge precise, transactional, and durable alliances—balancing autonomy with strategic interdependence to shape the international system. India and France, bound by pragmatism rather than ideology, are pioneering a new model of defense cooperation.

The foundation is already in place—from jet engine co-development to maritime situational awareness—but momentum alone is not enough.

If India and France want a truly sustainable and fruitful partnership, they must cut red tape, accelerate joint R&D, and finalize co-production agreements. Hesitate now, and they risk becoming footnotes in a region shaped by outside powers.

Sources

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