The Digital Silk Road: China’s Technological Engagement in Africa

China has emerged as Africa's largest trading partner as a result of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a multi-trillion-dollar set of infrastructural projects facilitating a transnational flow of goods and services into underdeveloped countries. However, beyond physical infrastructure, China's ambitions are increasingly extending into the digital realm with the BRI being complemented by the Digital Silk Road (DSR) (El Kadi, 2021). The DSR was introduced in 2015 and focuses on addressing digital infrastructure deficits in emerging economies like Africa, which struggle with limited development. With numerous African countries participating, the DSR is intensifying Africa’s ties with China and is emerging as the key component of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) vision for the BRI; this burgeoning influence raises concerns about data sovereignty, cybersecurity, and long-term technological dependence (Greene & Triolo, 2020).

As Africa’s economic growth is accelerating and eclipsing the global average, the continent comprises an attractive market. However, the rapid expansion of digital infrastructure carries risks, particularly the potential for excessive debt distress,  resulting in an economic dependency which can have far-reaching implications for resource management and policy making. China, with its production exceeding that of the next nine largest manufacturers combined (Baldwin, 2024), has capitalised on the disparity between demand and production and positioned itself as vital for African countries looking to build their Information and Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure (Magnus & Bretherton, 2020). Chinese firms have swiftly met this urgent need for digital infrastructure through the provision of inexpensive technology and loans with relatively modest instant demands, making it a more viable alternative to Western investments which carry with them tighter conditions.

China’s digital investment comprises the material investment of fibre optic cables, broadband networks, mobile equipment infrastructure, data centres, satellites and antennas, and the non-material assets of standards and protocols for telecommunications technologies (Agbebi, 2022). This extensive investment comes with a certain degree of control over data flows as true data sovereignty is contingent on absolute control over digital infrastructure - most of which, in Africa’s case, is being supplied through private investment by Chinese tech firms (El Kadi, 2021). The extent of China’s authority over Africa’s tech stacks can pose cybersecurity risks. Chinese tech giant Huawei, for instance, has been reported to have used computers and telecommunications networks built for African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa to transfer data to servers in Shanghai every day for five years (Reuters, 2018). 

However, Africa’s capacity to counteract China’s potential economic and digital hegemony over its data flows is constrained by virtue of its profound financial and infrastructural dependence on foreign aid (Bagwandeen, 2023). When compounded by its own fragile political and judicial systems, this acutely restricts the ability of African countries to choose their trading partners freely. Africa’s drastic exigency for digital infrastructure is irrefutable, and while the West remains skeptical of the frequency and profusion of China’s engagement in Africa, it is critical to acknowledge that Chinese investments have enabled African nations to make technological progress that they would otherwise struggle to accomplish. For instance, Chinese telecommunications firms, such as Huawei and Zhongxing Telecom Ltd (ZTE) have been responsible for the proliferation of 4G and 5G networks, significantly improving connectivity in Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa among others (El Kadi, 2022). For many African countries, rejecting such Chinese aid would mean delaying the development of its digital economy, which is crucially needed to catch up to the demands of the continent’s exponentially growing population. 

DSR initiatives largely originate in the private sector and are not necessarily always a part of a labyrinthine Chinese state scheme to dominate underdeveloped market economies. Rather, Chinese tech firms, even if operating to a certain degree under the CCP, represent its broader agenda of extending its influence on multilateral data rules, regulations, and foreign policy on tech on a global scale; DSR initiatives then are perhaps indicative of Beijing’s deeper ambition to resist what it perceives to be a US dominated tech landscape (Greene & Triolo, 2020). 

As Africa continues to exercise an over-reliance on Chinese aid, it is contentious how much autonomy it will have in the upcoming decades to control governance over data generated through cyber activities within its borders. Rather than instinctively viewing Chinese involvement as generally favourable, African countries need to be more proactive in ensuring that the advantages of the DSR line up with their own governance goals and do not undermine the continent’s long term ambitions of data sovereignty for its digital economy; African countries must encourage a shift from merely consuming to producing technology.

Sources

George Magnus and Hannah Bretherton, “Will digital diplomacy cement the Belt and Road Initiative’s “common destiny”?,” London School of Economics (blog), September 17, 2020.

Nathalie Lees, “The digital side of the Belt and Road Initiative is growing,” The Economist, February 6, 2020. 

Matthew S. Erie & Thomas Streinz, “The Beijing Effect: China’s Digital Silk Road as Transnational Data Governance,” 54 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1 February 2021.

Aaron Masho, “China denies report it hacked African Union headquarters,” Reuters. January 30, 2018. 

Linda Calabrese, “China and Africa: can the West learn anything?,” King’s College London. January 16, 2024.

Tin Hinane El Kadi, “The Promise and Peril of the Digital Silk Road,” Chatham House. September 21, 2021. 

Mandira Bagwandeen, “The China Factor in Africa’s Pursuit of Digital Sovereignty,” The Africa Governance Papers, 1(3). July 7, 2023. 

Folashadé Soulé, “Digital Sovereignty in Africa: Moving beyond Local Data Ownership,” Centre for International Governance Innovation. June 25, 2024. 

Robert Greene and Paul Triolo, “Will China Control the Global Internet Via its Digital Silk Road?,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. May 8, 2020.