United States 2022 Nuclear Posture Review

Andrew Richardson

     The Biden administration is in the midst of conducting a nuclear posture review. Likely to be released in early 2022, it will be a routine review of nuclear policy. Key allies of the United States are reportedly concerned that President Biden may consider adopting a ‘No First Use’ (NFU) clause, which would commit the United States to retaining a nuclear arsenal only for retaliatory measures. The sole purpose clause would not necessarily prohibit a first strike but instead reinforce the notion that a nuclear weapon exists to deter aggression and retaliate if necessary. In contrast, several Democratic politicians have endorsed the adoption of an NFU. President Biden showed support for adopting a form of a sole purpose pledge during his 2020 campaign.

     There are advantages for the United States to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security strategy. The U.S.-led Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) bans non-nuclear-weapon states from acquiring nuclear weapons and commits nuclear weapon states to make progress towards eventual disarmament. In recent years, non-nuclear-weapon states have not been satisfied with the progress made towards disarmament. Reactions have manifested in aggressive attempts of arms control agreements like the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which aims to eliminate all nuclear weapons. Perhaps the loss of faith in arms control could force non-nuclear countries to eventually seek nuclear weapons to ensure their own security.

     In South Korea, polling shows that about 60 percent of the population supports the development of nuclear weapons. Such a sentiment will manifest if there is less security around the United States’ extended deterrence capabilities. Saudi leaders have made comments regarding pursuing their own nuclear weapons with reference to the outcome of the Iran nuclear deal.

  Contemporary critics of NFUs or sole purpose clauses argue it would undermine the United States’ ability to deter aggression from Russia, China, and North Korea. At a time where the U.S.’s adversaries are modernizing their nuclear capabilities, limiting the United States’ retaliatory options could embolden them to act aggressively. During the Cold War, strategic ambiguity regarding the size and scale of retaliation served to discourage aggression—both nuclear and conventional strikes—and brinkmanship from U.S. adversaries.

While an NFU clearly precludes the U.S. from first-strike capability, a sole purpose pledge can take a few different forms based on how it is articulated. Ankit Panda and Vipin Narang examine the distinctions between the prospect of including NFU and sole purpose clause in U.S. nuclear posture. They concluded that based on its formulation, a sole purpose pledge can rule out U.S. first strike or be a more vague declaration that the U.S. nuclear arsenal would only be used in extreme circumstances.

  The United States should seek to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in global security policy (and by extension raise the threshold for nuclear use), without destabilizing the current umbrella of extended deterrence. A sole purpose pledge should reinforce the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in deterring nuclear aggression against the U.S. and its allies. However, it should not limit the purpose of nuclear weapons to retaliation. If America’s allies still have concerns, there are other measures that can help maintain security stability such as using conventional forces to maintain and strengthen the United States’ framework of extended deterrence. Hopefully, a sufficiently open-ended sole purpose pledge can satisfy United States’ allies’ security wants while also demonstrating nuclear restraint and a reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in overall U.S. security policy.