Nuclear Proliferation to Terrorist Actors and Rogue States

Andrew Richardson

The destructive capabilities of WMDs (notably nuclear and chemical weapons) makes their proliferation to rogue states and terrorist groups the single greatest security threat globally. The consequence for one nuclear launch is nuclear war, and likely human extinction and there are no mitigating and adaptable technologies available that can preserve human societies amidst a nuclear conflict. Rising distrust in the U.S.-led nuclear nonproliferation regime will surely lead to more states seeking nuclear weapons. The examples of Iran, North Korea, and Syria illustrate. the danger posed by WMDs proliferating to aggressive, unstable states and terrorist organizations.

The current nuclear nonproliferation regime under the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) will have to contend with an increasing number of challenges in the coming years. Many members of the international community question the commitment of nuclear weapon states to disarmament, which has led to the creation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons(TPNW) [1] . The TPNW has been criticized by the United States as divisive to the broader nonproliferation regime [2]. While the TPNW is a sign of an effort to speed up the process of abolishing nuclear weapons, rational deterrence theory suggests that, today’s international security landscape, in part, depends on the presence of nuclear weapons for stability. Well known nuclear scholars such as Matthew Kroenig posit that, at least for the moment, the world is a safer place with the United States retaining its vast nuclear capabilities [3]. In essence, the slow steps taken by nuclear weapons states towards disarmament, hinders their ability to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As this process continues, it is possible that more states abandon the prospect of nuclear arms reduction and seek to acquire WMDs themselves. Amidst the uncertain future of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, new potential nuclear weapons states are emerging. North Korea has spent most of its recent history first acquiring nuclear weapons and then building up its nuclear arsenal and delivery systems. Likewise, Iran has sought a nuclear arsenal to contend with its regional rival Israel and the United States. Part of the difficulty in dealing with rogue states is that each will require a different diplomatic approach. While a proponent of deterrence might argue that mutually assured destruction will ensure global stability, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities coupled with its belligerent rhetoric towards its neighbors, such as South Korea and Japan, as well as the United States, is nevertheless concerning. In addition, the anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli contingent in Iran that characterizes much of its foreign policy underscores why the potential for them to acquire nuclear weapons should be particularly concerning [4]. The role of nuclear weapons as a coercive tool suggests that there is a wide array of aggressive behaviors for which both states can use nuclear weapons without even launching them [5]. Additionally, rogue states, particularly North Korea, that are seemingly on the brink of collapse could fall victim to the ‘use them or lose them’ logic. According to this logic, the North Korean leader may feel compelled to use his arsenal if his demise is in sight.

In addition to being problematic and destabilizing states, Iran and North Korea are both on the United States list of state sponsors of terrorism [6]. Another prominent member of that list, Syria, has used chemical weapons against its own population in a civil war, which involves the terrorist group ISIS [7]. Links between WMDs and terrorism pose a significant danger, because most terrorist groups do not have a clear territory where a counter nuclear strike could occur, which calls into question whether deterrence would hold. Terrorist actors and rogue states that do not have civilian control over their military and have less sophisticated command and control systems are more likely to fall victim to nuclear accidents [8]. Each of these situations will require a unique diplomatic strategy to address the danger of proliferation. What we know for certain is that the spread of WMDs to unpredictable states such as Iran, North Korea, and Syria is a threat to the international security landscape, to the national security of the United States and its allies, and an impediment to the end-goal of disarmament. Until the nuclear nonproliferation regime can more effectively wed the concepts of deterrence providing temporary stability and a viable path to nuclear zero, nuclear cooperation will continue to fracture, leading more states to seek nuclear weapons programs.

References

1 Kimball, Daryl G. “The Nuclear Ban Treaty: A Much-Needed Wake-Up Call.” Arms Control Today. Arms Control Association , November 2020. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-11/focus/nuclear-ban-treaty-much-needed-wake-up-call.

2 Lederer, Edith M. “US Urges Countries to Withdraw from UN Nuke Ban Treaty.” AP NEWS. Associated Press, October 22, 2020. https://apnews.com/article/nuclear-weapons-disarmament-latin-america-united-nations-gun-politics-4f109626a1cdd6db10560550aa1bb491.

3 Kroenig, Matthew. “Nuclear Zero? Why Not Nuclear Infinity?” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Harvard Kennedy School, July 30, 2011. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/nuclear-zero-why-not-nuclear-infinity.

4 Tabatabai, Ariane. “Negotiating the ‘Iran Talks’ in Tehran: the Iranian Drivers That Shaped the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.” The Nonproliferation Review 24, no. 3-4 (February 1, 2018): 225–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2018.1426180.

5 Kroenig, Matthew. The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters. New York, NY:Oxford University Press, 2018.

6 “State Sponsors of Terrorism - United States Department of State.” U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State, December 14, 2020. https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/.

7 Sanger, David E., and Ben Hubbard. “A Hard Lesson in Syria: Assad Can Still Gas His Own People.” The New York Times. The New York Times, April 14, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/14/us/politics/syria-chemical-weapons-analysis.html#:~:text=A%20year%20ago%2C%20after%20President,al%2DAssad%2C%20had%20originated.&text=Assad's%20ability%20to%20gas%20his,Gen.

8 Sagan, Scott D. “More Will Be Worse.” Essay. In The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, edited by Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, 51–51. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995.